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Discussant's Response to
Relationship of Auditing Standards
To Detection of Fraud
John J. Willingham
University of Houston
I believe it fair to begin by summarizing George Catlett's paper as an
affirmation of the conventional wisdom of the accounting profession. Adherence
to the standards of a profession must always be seen by responsible citizens as
admirable, and therefore criticism is difficult. I n this regard, I w i l l not present
esoteric criticism that sometimes characterizes the remarks of teachers i n situations such as this, nor w i l l I dwell at length o n selected statements i n the paper.
However, i f you w i l l indulge me, I wish to respond to one statement because
it sets a tone for the paper and for the conventional wisdom of the profession
which I would like to see changed. Under the heading "Representations by
Clients," the following statement can be found: "[Auditors'] . . . responsibilities do not include infallibility or clairvoyance."
"Responsibilities" of CPAs
In this statement, as well as in many other parts of the paper, either explicitly or implicitly, Catlett suggests that the detection of fraud could become
a "responsibility" and an onerous one at that. Presently it is reasonably clear,
at least to accounting practitioners and students, that detection of fraud is not
an objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements. However, should
this objective be undertaken by C P A s , i t would not necessarily constitute a new
"responsibility." Should such an objective be assumed, it seems likely that it
would result from a demand for service either directly from clients or indirectly
from clients through a governmental or other agency charged to represent the
public. Further, I might add, that assumption of such a "responsibility" should
carry with it appropriate remuneration.
I a m suggesting that the services or functions of a profession evolve over
time and the nature of these services is dictated largely by customers w h o
demand services and are w i l l i n g to pay for them. Finally, I a m also suggesting
that the accounting profession should feel flattered and privileged to be asked
to extend its services to a desirous public. T h i s is, of course, a simplification of
the rather complex problem of attesting to the material absence of fraud i n the
operations of an entity. T o clarify m y position, however, I would like to take
up several specific topics included i n the subject paper and attempt to relate
them to this potential extension of the attest function.
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Nature of Fraud
T h e paper outlines the nature of fraud i n a manner that should be satisfyi n g to most accountants. Examples of various types of fraud are listed and even
these examples appear to be inclusive of the vast majority of frauds that are
perpetrated. However, the paper dwells at length on cases of fraud which are
concealed through collusion and tends to ignore defalcation and embezzlement
by individuals. Catlett states that " . . . major cases usually include collusion
among officers and/or employees, or collusion w i t h outside persons." C P A
firms certainly should be able to support a statement such as this one. I cannot,
but I do k n o w that there are many individuals now i n prison w h o were convicted
of embezzlement and who d i d not collude w i t h anyone. Many of you probably
w i l l remember the study of defalcators published over 20 years ago i n The
Journal of Accountancy. T h e study by D o n a l d Cressey centered on convicted
defalcators incarcerated at Illinois State Prison at Joliet. Cressey's purpose was
to determine the causes of defalcations. H e generalized about the process of
defalcation i n the following way:
Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive
of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-sharable; (2)
have the knowledge or awareness that this problem can be secretly
resolved by violation of the position of financial trust; and (3) are able
to apply to their own conduct i n that situation a verbalization which
enables them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons
with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or
property. Unless there is movement through this sequence, a trusted
person does not become a violator. 1
T h i s study along with other studies by students of D r . Cressey have indicated that some types of fraud do not include collusion. If an auditor were to
attest to the material absence of fraud, he should consider this type of fraud
as well as such misrepresentations by management as over- or under-statement
of assets and liabilities and irregular and/or deceitful transactions. Presently,
auditors have an excellent opportunity to uncover an individual defalcation
through the review and evaluation of internal control. A l l pronouncements on
the nature of internal control emphasize division of duties and responsibilities
in a manner that prevents errors and defalcations unless collusion exists. If most
perpetrators (at least those who are caught and convicted) have nonsharable
problems and perpetrate embezzlements w i t h no collusive help, the auditor
should be able to discern weaknesses i n the control system which could allow
for the existence of such fraud w i t h the use of current internal control evaluation standards and procedures.
Audit Objectives
Apparently, some frauds involve collusive arrangements, but some do not.
It would seem that all should be included i n any definition of fraud if a stance
is taken on the subject of attesting to the material absence of fraud. However,
a more important consideration to this discussion concerns objectives of audits.
Historically, these objectives have changed. B r o w n suggests that the detection
of fraud was recognized as a major audit objective until at least 1940. 2 H e
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also indicates that beginning around the turn of the century fairness began to
overshadow detection of fraud as a stated audit objective, and that detection
of fraud seemed to disappear as a stated audit objective around 1940 due largely
to the effect on the profession of the McKesson & Robbins case. Perhaps the
discussion of the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud has not yet
diminished because it was a stated audit objective for over 400 years and was
removed as an objective by the profession rather than by a change i n demand
of clients of accounting firms. A solicitous consuming public could reinstate it.
If this were to happen, the terms might be more advantageous for C P A s than
they were during the period previous to the McKesson & Robbins case.
The detection of fraud as an audit objective might resurface as a part of the
ordinary examination of financial statements or as a special examination of
financial statements. Recently there has been much more interest i n attestation
of representations other than those which appear i n historical financial statements. Forecasts and interim financial statements are two possible extensions
of the attest function that are of current interest to the profession.
Whether the potential extension of the auditor's opinion is forecasts, interim
financial statements, or detection of fraud, history indicates that the process w i l l
evolve slowly over time. A n y extension probably w i l l not result from a sudden
pronouncement of the A I C P A ; instead, any such pronouncement w i l l follow
rather widespread practice i n the field. Should detection of fraud again become
a stated audit objective, either as a part of the ordinary examination of financial
statements or through a demand for special reports asserting the absence of fraud,
auditing standards must be judged for their appropriateness to the task.
Auditing Standards
Current general and field work standards seem to apply equally well to
audits of financial statements and to audits designed to detect the existence of
fraud. A s mentioned earlier, the requirement for review and evaluation of
internal control should ferret out all but the most insignificant embezzlement
or defalcation perpetrated by a lone individual. T h e search for other types of
fraud seems to be covered by the third standard of field w o r k which requires
"sufficient competent evidential matter." T h a t standard goes on to indicate that
this evidence should be obtained "through inspection, observation, inquiries, and
confirmations." A l l of the types of fraud that result from situations other than
"nonsharable problems" are transaction based. Purchases, sales, cash receipts,
and cash disbursements are recorded and result i n balances that appear i n
accounts. If the balances are incorrect due to fraud, evidence of that fraud
should be available. T h i s evidence may not always be conclusive, as sometimes
seems to be true i n the ordinary examination of financial statements. Nevertheless, some evidence w i l l exist.
Because accounting data are transaction based, evidence theory indicates
that auditors should corroborate client representations by obtaining information
from the other party to the transaction or a third independent party such as a
bank. Evidence is gathered by auditors i n the field by applying this theory
through the use of confirmations (a direct means) and such things as examination of invoices and cancelled checks (an indirect means). In summary, auditing
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standards seem broad enough to encompass audits for the purpose of detection
of fraud.
In most of the fraud cases that are covered i n the literature there are problems of interpretation of auditing standards, and i n a few cases, apparent violations of them. A s M r . Catlett suggests, standards must be distinguished from
procedures and I would suggest that it is procedures used i n applying standards
that might have to be changed should fraud detection become an objective of
either a special examination or the ordinary examination of financial statements.
A u d i t i n g Procedures
T h e changes that should occur i n audit procedures are really changes that
should occur whether or not fraud detection becomes an objective of the ordinary
examination. T o discover any characteristic of a population of data, sampling
techniques can be used. Discovery sampling, for example, seems particularly
appropriate to investigation of potential frauds. Discovery sampling is not particularly helpful i n situations where fraudulent transactions or behavior constitute
an extremely minor percent of the transactions or behavior experienced i n an
organization. However, i f fraud is material, such techniques could be helpful.
Scientific sampling currently is very helpful i n the ordinary examination of
financial statements. T h e characteristics of interest are different, but the purpose
is identical: to discover characteristics and assess their importance. It is difficult
to assess the degree to which statistical sampling is utilized by auditors, but it
seems clear from the literature that it is far more reliable than judgment sampling
techniques. Should detection of fraud become a n objective of the auditor's
examination, scientific sampling certainly w o u l d have to be used i n order to
assess the risk taken i n attesting to the absence of material fraud. Also, an
auditor should be interested i n assessing the risk he is now taking i n his opinion
on financial statements for an ordinary examination where fraud is explicitly
denied as an objective.
One additional example of an audit procedure that might change should
fraud again become an audit objective is confirmation. It is m y understanding
that negative confirmation requests are still quite prevalent i n spite of the fact
that when a n auditor does not receive a reply from a request, he has no basis
for determining whether the amount to be confirmed is correct or the respondent
is nonexistent, uninterested, or unresponsive. I n an audit of accounts receivable,
if confirmation requests were sent and the objective were to determine whether
the accounts receivable were fraudulently stated, I do not believe that many auditors would want to rely on the use of negative confirmations. Instead, positive
confirmations would be utilized with careful and extensive followup. A g a i n ,
I would suggest that such procedure would be appropriate i n the ordinary
examination where the objective is not detection of fraud; however, it becomes
much more important when the objective is detection of fraud.
Professional A u d i t Service
Earlier, it was suggested that the use of the term "responsibility" perhaps
was inappropriate. Instead it was suggested that demands for C P A s ' services
should be treated as opportunities and privileges to serve society. W h e n such
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requests are made, they represent recognition by society that C P A s have the
competence and the integrity to perform the services requested. Competence
often is brought into arguments against extension of the attest function to other
areas. I n such arguments it is suggested that the competence of C P A s lies i n
their abilities as accountants and that to attest anything or offer a service that
is outside of the field that has been k n o w n traditionally as accounting w o u l d
be to engage i n services beyond their abilities and that therefore the public
might lose confidence. T h i s , of course, could happen; however, i n my opinion
C P A s w i l l not seek out engagements i n which they must offer a service that
they have not offered previously. Rather, society w i l l ask C P A s to provide the
new service. T h i s has happened i n many instances over the years to the extent
that management services departments of C P A firms engage i n salary surveys,
executive search and other activities that cannot be considered, even remotely,
as traditional accounting services. T h u s far, no consequent loss of public confidence has occurred.
Although I a m not a practitioner, I think there is one change that should
be made i n the practice of public accounting, should requests for extensions of
the attest function and other services be made by the public. I n almost every
profession, some allowance is made i n the fee structure for the relative risk
involved. Delicate surgical operations are more expensive than routine low-risk
surgical operations. W i t h the possible exception of some securities registrations,
C P A s apparently have not built into their billing structures any allowance for
risk that might be present i n a given engagement. Should C P A s be asked to
attest to the absence or presence of material fraud, i t would seem wise to adjust
billing methods to allow for risks being undertaken. A g a i n , there is a parallel
to attestation of financial statements. G i v e n current litigation against accountants,
it would seem appropriate for C P A s to assess risk i n each ordinary engagement
and adjust the fee according to the estimate of the risk to be undertaken.
Conclusion
Services or functions of any profession evolve over time and should be
seen as opportunities or privileges. A t the same time, professionals should assess
the value of their services and the risks that may be involved and bill clients
accordingly. Furthermore, historically, audit examinations w i t h some stated
objective have been undertaken before standards were developed. A s indicated
previously, B r o w n asserted i n his article that audits occurred prior to the year
1500 and were carried on for hundreds of years before auditing standards were
developed. A more recent example is that of attesting to some aspects of forecasts. Such services have been performed and are being performed n o w by
C P A s without any explicit standards. Therefore, I think it is unreasonable to
assume that standards should be developed before examinations w i t h the stated
objective of detection of fraud can be undertaken.
Finally, there is one important suggestion that comes from this paper. M r .
Catlett made assertions about the nature of fraud which can be substantiated
through research. If there is client interest i n attestation to the absence or
existence of material fraud, research should be undertaken i n the area. Almost
all C P A firms maintain files with experiences catalogued i n many different ways.
As a first step, it would be interesting to examine the files of C P A firms catalog61

i n g a l l types of fraud that have been discovered either during the course of an
examination or afterward. A classification system for this examination might
include type of fraud, method of concealment, industry, client size, and the
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the fraud. O n l y after extensive
research of this type can the profession properly assess the likelihood of discovery
of fraud and the risk the C P A is taking when he attests to the absence of it.
Catlett's paper concludes w i t h the following statement: " . . . the accounti n g profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming responsibilities
or accepting a role that cannot be successfuly fulfilled." I would add to that
statement that the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed
by refusing to provide requested services to society. Destruction i n this latter
case w i l l be much slower but nonetheless definite.
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